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6
SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE
Catherine}. Norris

In the early 1990s, an ad executive named Herbert Weinstein was accused of strangling his wife to
death and then throwing her body out the window of their apartment in Manhattan in an attempt
to make the crime look like a suicide (Rosen, 2007). His defense argued that Weinstein should not
be held responsible for his behavior, given the presence of an abnormal arachnoid cyst in his brain.
Ultimately, the prosecution allowed Weinstein to plead guilty to a lesser crime, that of manslaugh
ter, rather than allowing his brain scans to be submitted as evidence, as they were worried the jury
would be unduly swayed. Although this is an extreme example of the relationship between brain
and social behavior, it raises serious questions about the nature of guilt and responsibility for one's
actions; questions that are central to the field of psychology. If our (social) behavior is determined
by the brain, are we responsible for our own actions when there is a neurological abnormality or
defect? Clearly, the connection between brain function and behavior is critical. Social neuroscience
is a subfield of psychology that has developed to better understand social behavior by studying the
brain and body, and the reverse.

What Is Social Neuroscience 7
A general, broad definition of social neuroscience is the use of neuroscientific methods-including
those drawn from the fields of psychophysiology, neuropsychoimmunology, and behavioral endo
crinology-to study social psychological questions and processes. In other words, social neurosci
ence encompasses the use of the body and brain to understand social behavior, as well as the impact
of social behavior on the function of the body and brain. Social neuroscience is not defined by its
methods or its populations, and draws from research on biological systems, organisms, animals, and
humans, although the current chapter will focus on the latter. Thus, the field of social neuroscience
is by definition multimodal and interdisciplinary and often requires collaborative research incorpo
rating perspectives from multiple specialists in diverse areas.
Although the biological influences on psychological processes have often been viewed as reduc
tionistic and therefore unhelpful for understanding social behavior, the roots of social neuroscience
were planted long ago. Gordon Allport, the father of research on attitudes, defined an attitude as "a
mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic
influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related"
(Allport, 1935, p. 810). The inclusion of the brain as essential for understanding a fundamental
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FIGURE 6.1 Results From Two PubMed Searches: One for the Union of the Terms "Social" and
"Neuroscience "(dark gray) and a Second for the Term "Social Neuroscience" (light gray).
Note: The scale of the y-axis is logarithmic. Results for the year 2016 (striped bars) are projected based on occur
rences in the first four months of the year; 1,338 for "social" and "neuroscience" and 152 for "social neuroscience."

concept such as an attitude is notable in the absence of advanced neuroimaging or other meth
odological tools necessary for the measurement of such influences. Indeed, the growth of the field
of social neuroscience has been strongly driven both by the advent of methodological innovations
such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fl\1RI) and commercially available systems for col
lection of electroencephalography (EEG) and psychophysiological signals, such as electrodermal
activity (EDA) and electromyography (EMG), and the necessity for developing indirect measures
for investigating socially sensitive topics, such as race bias, as well as cognitive and emotional pro
cesses difficult to unearth through pure introspection.
A recent search of the PubMed database for the union of the terms "social" and "neuroscience"
in article titles, abstracts, and key words since the year 1981 (i.e., the year in which the two terms
began to coincide annually) reveals tremendous growth, from 2 occurrences in 1981 to over 2,700
in 2015 (and projected to be over 4,000 in 2016; Figure 6.1). This search, however, may overesti
mate the true prevalence of work that combines these theoretical perspectives. A second search for
the term "social neuroscience" shows the same pattern, from a single use in 1994 to just over 250
appearances in 2015 (and projected to be 450 in 2016). Given that this search is conservative in
scope as it ignores related terms, such as social cognitive neuroscience, psychoneuroimmunology,
social psychophysiology, and others, it vastly underestimates the growth in literature while still cap
turing the rise in interest and publication rates. In addition, a quick search on Amazon for "social
neuroscience" in books reveals 5,855 matches, including textbooks, conference proceedings, and
books produced for the popular press. Clearly, combining biological and psychological perspectives
to understanding social behavior has gained in both appreciation and perceived utility.

A Brief History
Although the advent of neuroimaging techniques, compact and ambulatory systems for collection
of psychophysiological signals, smart phones, and other technological advances have greatly fur
thered the field of social neuroscience, its roots are firmly planted in careful, systematic observation
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of neurological patients who displayed social and emotional deficits following brain damage. Per
haps the most famous of these patients is Phineas Gage, the unlucky railroad worker who exhibited
major personality changes following an accident in which a tamping iron was driven through his
prefrontal cortex in 1848 (Harlow, 1848). According to reports published by his physician, John
Harlow, Gage never lost consciousness and was walking and speaking coherently within minutes of
the horrific accident, although his convalescence was extensive (Harlow, 1848). Harlow reported
that post-incident Gage, who had been described by his employers as efficient and capable pre
incident, "was no longer Gage," as he became irreverent, capricious, and showed no regard for
societal norms (Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, & Damasio, 2005). Though it was acknowl
edged at the time that certain brain structures were involved in cognitive functions such as language,
based on the groundbreaking work by Broca and Wernicke (Broca, 1861; Wernicke, 1875/1994),
Harlow's observations about Phineas Gage suggested that there was a neural basis for personality
and rational (social) behavior. W ithout postmortem evidence regarding the location and extent of
Gage's lesion, however, Harlow's claims were generally dismissed, until Hannah Damasio and her
colleagues (2005) obtained Gage's skull and the tamping iron and recreated its possible trajectory.
Their results indicated that both Broca's area and the motor and supplementar y motor cortices
were likely intact; whereas the bilateral ventromedial prefrontal cortices bore the brunt of Gage's
injuries. These findings, along with those from other neurological cases, contributed to the conclu
sion that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex plays a critical role in emotion and its utility in guiding
decision-making in the social realm (Damasio et al., 2005).
Phineas Gage was just one of many neurological cases that led researchers to the conclusion
that-just as there are neural mechanisms critical for higher level human capacities such as lan
guage, perception, and memory---emotion and social reasoning are also served by neural networks,
and the study of their deficits can shed light on normal human functioning. A second notable
example is that ofS.M., a female patient with a genetic condition called Urbach-W iethe disease
that resulted in the bilateral destruction of her amygdala, a midline brain structure that is part of the
limbic system (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994). The case ofS.M. provides a strong
counterpart to that of Phineas Gage, in that the extent and exact location of Gage's damage was
unknown during his lifetime, whereasS. M.'s damage has been thoroughly examined using neuro
anatomical measures, including structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and is known to be
confined to the amygdalae.S. M. has been studied extensively, and her behavioral deficits have been
well documented. Most notably,S. M. is impaired in her recognition of fear expressions (Adolphs
et al., 1994), does not appear to experience fear (e.g., when viewing film clips, interacting with spi
ders, and entering a haunted house; Feinstein, Adolphs, Damasio, & Tranel, 2011), misjudges unap
proachable and untrustworthy faces (Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 1998), and fails to show typical
fear conditioning, while maintaining declarative memory for an association between a novel and
a fear-inducing (loud noise) stimulus (Bechara et al., 1995). In sum,S. M. is often described in the
media as the "woman with no fear" (Babcock, 2014), and her case has led many to conclude that
the human amygdala is critical for the recognition and experience of fear.
The cases of Phineas Gage and S. M. underscore the contributions that have been made to
the field of social neuroscience through the study of brain-damaged patients. They also, how
ever, highlight some of the major issues presented by using neuroscience methods to study social
psychological processes. In the case of Phineas Gage, the extent and location of his lesion was
both unknown and uncontrolled (the strongest evidence of his injuries being localized to the
bilateral ventromedial PFC comes from posthumous study of his skull; Damasio, Grabowski, Frank,
Galaburda, & Damasio, 1994), meaning that his observed behavioral deficits may be due to damage
to particular structures, damage to connectivity between affected and intact structures, or possibly
even the trauma (or recuperation from the injury) itself. Furthermore, Gage was not subjected
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to controlled laboratory investigations to examine his behavioral deficits; reports were primarily
published by one individual-his physician, Harlow-based on casual observation. Certainly, these
data have been instrumental in advancing thinking about the contributions of neurological find
ings to the study of social and emotional behavior, but require both caution in interpretation and
careful, scientific examination. Indeed, Gage and other patients with ventromedial prefrontal lesions
inspired researchers to develop behavioral tasks for systematic study of impairments in the role of
emotion in guiding decision-making, including the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio,
Damasio, & Anderson; 1994; see also Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006 for a critical review).
Although the extent and location of S. M.'s damage are well-known and -documented (i.e.,
bilateral amygdala), many of the same concerns are applicable when using that knowledge along
with her behavioral deficits to make assumptions regarding links between behavior and brain locali
zation of function. Through systematic, scientific examination ofS. M.'s deficits in socioemotional
processes, researchers have often concluded that the amygdala is "responsible" for fear. Careful
study has ruled out the possibility that these deficits extend to other emotions, as S. M. does not
exhibit deficits in processing other emotional facial expressions (e.g., disgust, happiness, anger) or
in the experience of those emotions (Adolphs et al., 1994). It is still possible, however, that fear
simply represents one manifestation of a more global human function. Indeed, complementary data
from other approaches suggests that the amygdala is implicated in the processing of stimuli with
biological relevance (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010; Adolphs, 2010), of which fear is a subcategory. More
recently, researchers have used positron emission tomography (PET) to demonstrate an association
between amygdala activation and positive emotions (Hamann, Ely, Hoffman, & Kilts, 2002), sug
gesting that the role of the amygdala in emotional processing is not confined to fear.
Both of these examples demonstrate the need for careful experimental work and cautious interpre
tation of observed relationships between neural activation and behavior. Importantly, such criticisms
extend far beyond the examination of lesioned individuals and have become more significant as the
psychological construct of interest becomes more difficult to define and study. Cacioppo and Berntson
(1992; Cacioppo, Hawkley, & Berntson, 2003) have written extensively on both the benefits and com
plications of taking multilevel approaches, in which research bridges levels of representation of either
brain or behavior, to studying broad psychological concepts. They state that "the level of organization
of psychological phenomena can vary from the molecular, to the cellular, to the tissue, to the organ, to
the system, to the organism, to the physical environment, to the sociocultural context" (Cacioppo &
Berntson, 1992, p. 1020).Some researchers perform single-level analyses, staying within one level of this
organization, and study the behavioral components of major depressive disorder (MDD) within individ
uals. Others may cross levels, by studying the sociocultural or neurochemical factors that may contribute
to the onset of MDD. Clearly, both approaches are critical for a thorough understanding of the disorder,
and an understanding of both is essential for the development of interventions and treatments for MDD.
The complexity of investigating these questions, however, increases dramatically as a function of the
number of levels crossed. The field of social neuroscience by definition relies on multilevel analysis and
must therefore be particularly sensitive to issues regarding the crossing of multiple levels. Although these
issues are beyond the scope of the current chapter, any student of social neuroscience should be familiar
with the complications of multilevel analysis (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1992; Cacioppo et al., 2003) and
should be encouraged to exercise caution in interpretation of results generated by such an approach.

Chapter Overview
The current chapter is divided into three sections. The first section will cover the literature on
how we understand the self in the context of others, including topics such as self-awareness, social
cognition, theory of mind, perspective taking, and emotional responses and regulation of those
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responses. The second section will address the research on how we respond to others, covering stud
ies on empathy, altruism, and cooperation; social rejection and exclusion; and intergroup processes
including social perception and categorization, stereotyping, and prejudice. I refer to this section
as responding to others rather than interacting with others for two reasons: first, few of the studies in
the second section utilize actual interpersonal interactions, but instead focus on solitary participants
engaging in laboratory-based experimental paradigms designed to mirror real-world encounters;
and second, the past few years have seen a surge of studies examining dyadic and group interac
tions in a wide variety of settings. The third section of the chapter will focus on these exciting new
developments on interpersonal interactions in the field of social neuroscience. Given the impos
sibility of covering an entire field in a single chapter, each topic section will begin with a summary
of a paper outlines some of the central issues and findings. Following will be a brief description of
other relevant and more current studies.

Understanding the Self in the Context of Others
It is often said that everyone knows what the self is, yet philosophers and psychologists alike have
struggled with defining, delineating, and understanding the concept, as well as its implications for
how we make sense of ourselves and the world around us. Humans are arguably one of the few
species that have an intuitive sense of self, of being an independent entity with volition and unique
experiences, and this ability is critical for our perceptions of our own actions, of others' actions, and
of our interactions. Self-awareness, the capacity to recognize that oneself is separate and independ
ent from others, has often been studied in both humans (typically infants or young children) and
other species (most notably chimpanzees, dolphins, and elephants) using the mirror self-recognition
task, in which a mark (e.g., an odorless dye) is placed on the individual's head (or other clearly vis
ible physical location) before being positioned in front of a mirror. Self-recognition is said to be
present if the individual does not merely inspect the mirror or look for a nearby conspecific, but
touches or otherwise reacts to the mark on their physical being (Amsterdam, 1972; Bard, Todd,
Bernier, Love, & Leavens, 2006; Gallup, 1970). Studies have shown that chimpanzees and human
infants (24-month olds) respond equally on the mark test (Bard et al., 2006), and researchers have
suggested that this ability indicates conscious awareness of oneself as separate from others. This
basic cognitive facility is thought to be important for self-evaluation and social comparisons, and is
thus critical for higher level social behavior. Furthermore, self-awareness also suggests that perhaps
the self, as well as information about the self, may be prioritized in social cognition, including how
we remember information, how we perceive the world, and how we understand others.

Self-Knowledge
In a now classic study, Kelley and his colleagues (2002) sought to determine whether knowledge
about the self is uniquely represented within the human brain. Their study was founded on the
robust finding from the memory literature that knowledge about the self is remembered better
than other types of semantic information (i.e., the self-reference effect in memory [SRE]; Klein,
2012; Symons & Johnson, 1997). Kelley and his colleagues (2002) argue that there are two expla
nations for the SRE in memory: first, that the self is a unique construct that facilitates encoding
and retrieval of information (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977), and second, that there is nothing
unique about the self, but that the SRE arises from more elaborative encoding of information that
is self-relevant (Klein & Loftus, 1988). The authors used fMRI to examine these two hypotheses.
Participants judged a series of trait adjectives either as (a) upper vs. lower cased, (b) other-relevant
or not ("Does this describe President George Bush?") or (c) self-relevant or not ("Does this describe
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you?"). Results indicated greater activation of the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) during semantic encoding (self and other) trials compared to nonsemantic
encoding (case) trials, consistent with a typical depth-of-processing effect. In addition, however, a
region of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) showed greater activation to self than to other or
to case judgment trials, consistent with that hypothesis that the self is unique and that the observed
SRE is not due simply to increased depth of processing.
Kelley and his colleagues (2002) used fMRI to effectively test two competing hypotheses regard
ing the psychological processes underlying the self-reference effect in memory. Other researchers
have followed up on this research in a number of ways. Mitchell, Banaji, and Macrae (2005) argued
that simulation theory, the idea that we use our own experiences and knowledge about ourselves
to understand the mental states of others, would predict that the MPFC should be implicated when
individuals are asked to make mentalizing judgments about similar others, in addition to making
judgements about themselves. Indeed, activity of the MPFC was correlated with self-reported per
ceived similarity of others, but only when individuals were asked to attend to the mental states of
those others. Ochsner and his colleagues (2002) used fMRI to explore the idea that self-knowledge
can be attained via direct appraisals, our beliefs about ourselves, reflected appraisals, or our beliefs
about how others view ourselves. Both direct and reflected appraisals were associated with increased
activation of the MPFC, suggesting again that the MPFC is implicated in self-awareness.
In addition to providing evidence that self-knowledge may be a construct that is uniquely
structured in the brain, findings from the initial study conducted by Kelley and his colleagues
(2002) also shed light on a broader question regarding the nature of neural activity. Specifically,
self-judgments were associated with greater relative MPFC activity as compared to other and case
judgments, but activity in all three conditions was found to be a decrease from baseline. In other
words, when performing any of the judgment tasks, the MPFC showed deactivation, but less so
for self-judgments than for other or case judgments. This finding is consistent with research on
the brain's default network (cf. Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008), a neural system that is
active when individuals are not focused on external events or tasks. A large body of research has
shown that the default network is instead active when individuals are focused on internal tasks, such
as thinking about the self, thinking about the perspectives of others, engaging in autobiographical
memory retrieval, or thinking about the future (Buckner et al., 2008). Thus, research on the neural
structure of self-knowledge has both shed light on the psychological processes involved in thinking
about the self and contributed to our understanding of default brain function.

Theory of Mind
The ability to think about and remember self-relevant information is clearly important for the
human species; the field of social neuroscience has begun to investigate the neural mechanisms
underlying this ability and in the process has shown that the MPFC is strongly implicated in self
referent tasks and is part of a broader default network responsible for internally focused cognitions.
The self is also, however, critical for how we understand others. Indeed, Mitchell and colleagues
(2005) argued that we use our own experiences and knowledge about ourselves to understand the
mental states of others. The ability to reason about and make inferences of other individuals' behav
iors based on our understanding of their minds is called theory of mind (ToM; Saxe & Kanwisher,
2003), and is also critical for the human species. ToM requires more than acknowledging the physi
cal presence of another as separate from the self; it includes the recognition that the mind of another
is also separate from the self and involves the reasoning about the contents of another's mind.
Saxe and Kanwisher (2003) extended existing neuroscience research on ToM by attempting
to isolate the underlying processes. Participants read stories while functional neuroimages were
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collected. T he two important story types were false belief stories, in which participants must infer a
hidden mental process to understand the behavior of a character (e.g., a mother discards newspaper
strips that are, unbeknownst to her, critical for her son's paper mache project), and mechanical infer
ence stories, in which participants must infer a hidden physical process to understand the "behavior"
of a nonhuman agent (e.g., water left in a hot pot on the stove overnight disappears). Arguably,
the critical difference between these conditions is whether participants are reasoning about mental
or physical states (additional analyses were conducted to address potential confounds, including
sociality and task difficulty). £MRI data revealed greater bilateral activation of the temporoparietal
junction (TPJ) when participants reasoned about mental as compared to physical states, and the
authors argue that the TPJ is thus a critical structure for reasoning about the minds of other people.
A great many studies have replicated these findings, as evidenced by a number of review articles (cf.
Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013; Saxe, 2006).
One important criticism of the research on the role of the TPJ in theory of mind is that the TPJ
(particularly the right TPJ) is also implicated in attention switching, when individuals are required
to switch their attention to task-relevant stimuli (Mitchell, 2008). Saxe and her colleagues (Scholz,
Triantafyllou, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Brown, & Saxe, 2009) have responded by showing that ToM and
endogenous attention selectively activate different regions of the TPJ. T his debate illustrates an
important discussion point for neuroscience research; namely, that there is rarely (if ever) a one-to
one mapping between psychological process and neural (or physiological) mechanism (Cacioppo &
Berntson, 1992; Cacioppo et al., 2003). T he TPJ may be important for ToM because of its role in
performing a secondary skill required to make inferences about other peoples' minds.

Perspective Taking
Theory of mind is a basic human characteristic that is required for making inferences about others'
behaviors. Taking this a step further, ToM may also help us take the perspective of others; under
stand their reasoning about their own behavior from their point of view. And by truly attempting
to understand others' minds, we may begin to understand not only how they act but also how they
feel. ToM, perspective taking, and empathy, or a sense of similarity between one's own experienced
emotions and the emotions expressed by someone else (Decety & Lamm, 2006), are intricately
linked. One dominant theory proposed to explain how we understand others' behaviors, thoughts,
and feelings is simulation theory, which suggests that mental simulation is critical for this uniquely
human behavior (Gordon, 1986, 1992). Following the discovery of mirror neurons, neurons that
respond both when observing and performing an action, in nonhuman primates, researchers pro
posed that the mirror neuron network may be critical for simulation (and thus for ToM, perspec
tive taking, and empathy), via behavioral mechanisms such as imitation and mimicry (Gallese &
Goldman, 1998). In an initial study examining the role of the mirror neuron network in empathy
in humans, Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, and Glan (2003) instructed participants to either
observe or imitate facial expressions of emotion while functional neuroimages were collected. Both
observing and imitating activated similar neural regions, including the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)
and superior temporal sulcus (STS), two regions proposed to be part of the human mirror neuron
network (Iacoboni, 2009). In addition, the insula and amygdala, two subcortical structures impli
cated in emotional processing, also were active when participants observed and imitated others'
emotions. Notably, all regions showed greater activation during imitation than during observation.
Carr and colleagues' (2003) results fall short of their initial aim, however, given that no link between
imitation and empathy is provided. And a long-standing debate over the purported existence of
mirror neurons in humans continues even today (Caramazza, Anzellotti, Strnad, & Lingnau, 2014;
Hickok, 2014; Marshall & Rossman, 2014).
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Another approach that researchers have taken to understand perspective taking and empathy is to
examine individuals' imagined responses to their own versus another's pain. Jackson, Brunet, Melt
zoff, and Decety (2006) asked individuals to imagine a painful stimulus either from a first-person
perspective (i.e., this is happening to you) or from a third-person perspective (this is happening to
someone else) and found greater activation of the rTPJ during imagining another's perspective/
pain than when imagining one's own pain, consistent with the possibility that the TPJ is implicated
in perspective taking. Furthermore, using the same first- versus third-person perspective approach,
Decety and his colleagues have shown that the rTPJ (or right inferior parietal cortex) is implicated
in perspective taking of simulated actions (Ruby & Decety, 2001) and of social emotions (Ruby &
Decety, 2004). Thus, both theory of mind tasks that require reasoning about the (false) contents of
another person's mind and perspective taking tasks that require a proposed simulation of another's
actions or feelings are associated with activation of the right temporoparietal junction.

Emotion and Emotion Regulation
Social neuroscience has been crucial in furthering research on constructs such as the structure of
self-knowledge, theory of mind, and perspective taking, all of which were initially studied using
carefully developed behavioral paradigms. The field of emotion research, however, has been charac
terized from its onset by the use of multiple methods and an interdisciplinary approach, likely due
to the difficulty of accurately introspecting about one's own emotional states, as well as the fact that
emotion has always been widely recognized as having both a physiological, physical component
in addition to a psychological, cognitive component (James, 1884). Although James argued that
felt emotional states are the product of lower sensory systems that produce a physical response to
a relevant stimulus (e.g., "we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we
tremble" [p. 248]), as early as the 1920s Cannon (1927) argued that the physical and psychologi
cal manifestations of emotions occur simultaneously and that subcortical structures of the brain
(specifically the thalamus) were specialized for producing emotional responses and expressions.
Emotion researchers have therefore often turned to psychophysiological measures to study these
elusive responses. Vrana, Spence, and Lang (1988) pioneered the use of the startle eyeblink reflex as
a probe for emotional responses, as they found that eyeblink amplitudes in response to a loud acous
tic stimulus were largest when individuals viewed unpleasant emotional images, middling to neutral
images, and smallest to pleasant emotional images. Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, and Hamm (1993)
also found that facial muscular activity as measured by electromyography (EMG) over the corru
gator supercilii (i.e., brow) and zygomaticus major (cheek) muscles corresponded to self-reported
valence judgments of emotional stimuli (also see Larsen, Norris, & Cacioppo, 2003), whereas
electrodermal activity (EDA, previously known as the Galvanic skin response or skin conductance)
corresponded to self-reported arousal judgments of emotional stimuli.
These examples focus on peripheral psychophysiological measures used to measure emotional
responses. The past 20 years or so have seen a surge in the use of central measures, including both
neuroimaging (PET, £MRI, MEG) and event-related brain potentials (ERPs), in the study of emo
tion. For example, Ito and her colleagues (1998) examined the negativity bias, the tendency to
respond more strongly to unpleasant than to equally extreme and arousing pleasant stimuli, using
ERPs and found that the late positive potential (LPP) of the ERP was larger to both unexpected
unpleasant and unexpected pleasant images as compared to neutral context images, but was even
larger to unpleasant compared to pleasant. Additional studies have replicated this negativity bias
(Norris et al., unpublished data), although some have argued that it changes over time (Wood &
Kisley, 2006). Initial neuroimaging studies examined the neural regions and networks activated by
emotional stimuli; meta-analyses have focused on networks implicated in emotional processing
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as a function of induction method (cf. Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002) and on regions
specialized for positive/negative valence and/or approach/withdrawal motivation (Wager, Phan,
Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003). More recent meta-analyses have shown that there is little correspond
ence between discrete emotions (e.g., sadness, happiness, anger, surprise) and activation of isolated
neural regions (Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Feldman Barrett, 2012) and instead argue
for a constructivist perspective, in which neural regions engaged in basic psychological processes
are implicated in various emotional experiences.
Perhaps more critically for the field of neuroscience has been the study of emotion regulation, or
the control of one's own emotional responses. In an initial study of the consequences of instructed
emotion regulation on self-reported, behavioral, and physiological responses, Gross (1998) asked
participants to either simply watch a series of disgusting films, to think about the film in such a
way that would minimize their emotional responses (i.e., reappraisaQ, or to behave in such a way
that someone watching them would not know how they were feeling (i.e., suppression). Psycho
physiological measures (e.g., skin conductance, a measure of arousal) and somatic activity (i.e.,
actual movement) were collected during the films, and self-reported emotional responses (including
disgust) were collected following the films. Participants were also videotaped during the films and
their behavioral and emotional responses were coded. Results showed that participants instructed to
reappraise reported experiencing less disgust than did those who watched or suppressed; however,
this pattern of results could be due to reappraisal participants falling subject to demand charac
teristics (i.e., instructions told them to minimize their feelings of disgust). Importantly, behavio
ral data indicated that both regulation groups showed less expressive and somatic activity. Taken
together, these results indicate that not all regulation is the same, and that instructed regulation may
decrease behavioral responses but not always impact self-reported affective responses. Furthermore,
physiological data showed that reappraisal was effective at minimizing arousal, whereas suppression
was not-in fact, physiological arousal was higher when participants suppressed than when they
watched. T he inclusion of physiological data allowed Gross (1998) to draw conclusions about the
impact of two regulation strategies on emotional responses that could not have been made other
wise, and represent a stride forward in understanding the efficacy of different forms of regulation.
However, questions regarding the mechanisms by which reappraisal decreases emotional reactivity
remained unanswered.
Drawing from Grass's (1998) initial' study and attempting to explore these underlying mecha
nisms using £MRI, Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, and Gabrieli (2002) asked participants to reappraise
negative scenes in unemotional terms. Compared to trials on which participants were asked to
simply attend to negative scenes, reappraisal of negative scenes was associated with decreased self
reported negative affect, decreased activation of the amygdala and the medial orbital frontal cortex
(MOFC), and increased activation of the ventral lateral prefrontal cortices (vLPFC). T he authors
suggest that this pattern indicates that, when instructed to reappraise, individuals may engage pre
frontal control mechanisms, which in turn down regulate activation of the amygdala, likely through
down-regulation of the MOFC (which provides an anatomical bridge between the vLPFC and
amygdala). In fact, increased activation of the vLPFC during reappraisal vs. attend trials correlated
with decreased activation of both the MOFC and the amygdala, supporting the authors' hypoth
eses. Additional analyses also revealed that increased activation of a region of the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC; BA 24) during reappraisal trials correlated with decreased negative affect ratings, sug
gesting a direct role of the ACC in down-regulation of experienced (or at least reported) negative
affect. In sum, Ochsner and his colleagues (2002) demonstrated that £MRI could be a useful tool for
understanding the mechanisms underlying the reappraisal of negative affect, and, in doing so, paved
the way for researchers to use neuroimaging methods to examine emotional processes.

Social Neuroscience 157
Ochsner and his colleagues (2004) followed up on this initial study by investigating the shared
and unique neural mechanisms implicated in the up- and down-regulation of negative affect.
Compared to a neutral "look" condition, both up- and down-regulation were associated with
increased activation of prefrontal and anterior cingulate regions implicated in cognitive control.
Amygdala activation also varied as a function of regulation, decreasing during down-regulation and
increasing during up-regulation. Combined, these findings constitute a replication and extension
of their previous work and demonstrate that regulation, regardless of direction, relies on a common
underlying control network that may influence amygdala reactivity. However, up- and down
regulation also recruited unique regions: up-regulation was associated with increased activation
of prefrontal regions associated with emotion knowledge (left rostromedial PFC), whereas down
regulation was associated with increased activation of prefrontal regions associated with behavioral
inhibition (right lateral and orbital PFC).
In addition, participants were assigned to either use a self-focused regulatory process, in which
they were instructed to either increase their subjective closeness (up-) or distance (down-regulation)
to negative scenes, or a situation-focused regulatory process, in which they were instructed to rein
terpret events as depicted in their situational context by imagine them getting worse (up-) or better
(down-regulation). As predicted, self-focus also recruited regions associated with self-knowledge
processing (i.e., the medial PFC; Kelley et al., 2002), while situation-focus recruited regions associ
ated with external focus (lateral PFC). Based on these and other results, Ochsner and Gross (2005)
argue that although regulation may activate a central cognitive control networks, different kinds of
regulation rely on different prefrontal regulatory regions.
Social neuroscience research on emotion regulation has not only illuminated the mechanisms
underlying emotional reactivity and its moderation, but has also shed light on mental health dis
orders such as depression. Unipolar depression has been associated with increased and sustained
amygdala reactivity (Abercrombie et al., 1998) and with decreased or disrupted activation of the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Johnstone, Van Reekum, Urry, Kalin, & Davidson, 2007). These
patterns have been observed both on traditional emotion regulation tasks (Johnstone et al., 2007)
and on independent tasks, such as rating of emotional words (increased amygdala activity) and
digit sorting (a purely cognitive task; decreased DLPFC activity; Siegle et al., 2007). Furthermore,
the relationship between DLPFC and amygdala activation also appears to be decreased in unipolar
depression, although these patterns are not homogenous across depressed individuals (Siegle et al.,
2007). These findings are suggestive of a number of mechanisms underlying depression, including
increased emotional reactivity, decreased regulation of emotional responses, or dysregulated com
munication between neural regions implicated in these processes. Using neuroimaging and other
methods to understand disruption of emotion regulation networks in mental health disorders such
as depression may lead to better treatments and interventions.

Responding to Others
Self-awareness and the structure of self-knowledge, theory of mind and perspective taking, and
emotion and emotion regulation are central to human functioning. Given that humans are a social
species, these processes are critical for guiding how individuals understand not only themselves
but also other conspecifics. To flourish in our social world, we must be able to not only under
stand ourselves, but we must also effectively communicate and respond to others. Many believe
that the expansion of the human brain evolved due to the complex demands of dealing with
others-competing or cooperating with them, deceiving or empathizing with them, understanding
or misjudging them. These processes are critical for survival in a social species, and we turn now
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to a consideration of the neuroscience research that has contributed to our understanding of the
mechanisms underlying how we respond to others.

Empathy, Altruism, and Cooperation
Empathy, defined previously as a sense of similarity between one's own experienced emotions and
the emotions expressed by someone else (Decety & Lamm, 2006), is thought to be critical for how
we respond to others and is dependent on our ability to take the perspective of someone else. Singer
and her colleagues (2004) used ™RI to examine individuals' responses to their own versus a loved
one's pain. Female participants were scanned while either they or their romantic partner received
a painful stimulation to their right hand. As expected, receiving pain activated the "pain matrix;'
a network of brain regions implicated in the experience of physical pain (Davis, 2000; Peyron
et al., 2002), including the primary and secondary somatosensory cortices, primary motor cortex,
bilateral insula, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), thalamus, brainstem, and cerebellum (Singer et al.,
2004). More importantly, participants also exhibited activation of the ACC and the bilateral insula,
regions of the pain matrix more associated with the emotional or affective aspects of pain than the
physical aspects, when their partners received pain, indicating shared neural networks during expe
rienced and empathic pain. Regions of the pain matrix associated with the physical aspects of pain,
including the somatosensory and motor cortices, were not activated when individuals observed
their partners experiencing pain, suggesting that empathy for pain involves emotional but not
physical pain. Furthermore, individual differences in empathy as measured by self-reports correlated
with activation of the ACC and insula, such that more empathic individuals exhibited increased
activation of these regions when they observed their partner in pain. These findings dovetail with
those presented by Decety and Jackson (2004), who used an indirect, imagery-based manipulation
of experienced versus empathic pain. Indeed, a recent meta-analysis has confirmed that across nine
independently conducted studies using both picture-based and cue-based (e.g., Singer et al., 2004)
paradigms, the ACC and insula are implicated in empathy for pain (Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011).
Empathy, sharing another's feelings, may be required for prosocial behavior or actually acting
to help someone experiencing pain or another negative emotion. Morrelli, Rameson, and Lieber
man (2014) used a picture-based paradigm to investigate neural responses during empathy for
individuals depicted experiencing pain. Outside of the ™RI scanner, participants also completed
a "daily helping checklist" on 14 consecutive evenings, in which they indicated whether they had
performed each of 11 different helping behaviors, including picking up a dropped item or holding
a door or an elevator. Replicating previous research, empathy for pain was associated with activation
of the bilateral insula and the ACC, in addition to regions thought to be part of the human mirror
neuron network (e.g., inferior parietal lobule [IPL], inferior frontal gyrus [IFG]). In addition, the
septal area, a region previously associated with prosocial behavior (Inagaki & Eisenberger, 2012), was
active during empathy for pain, and activation of the septal area was correlated with self-reported
daily helping. Thus, Morelli and colleagues (2014) effectively showed that neural activation of the
septal area in response to another's pain is related to frequency of prosocial behavior in real life.
Another aspect of responding to others concerns social interactions that require competition
versus cooperation. Both behaviors require perspective taking and theory of mind, as we must
consider the desires and needs of an interaction partner to determine the most appropriate (and
profitable) response in any situation. Cooperation and competition have often been studied using
economic decision-making games, such as the ultimatum game and the prisoner's dilemma. Decety,
Jackson, Sommerville, Chaminade, and Meltzoff (2004) manipulated cooperative and competitive
mindsets in participants as they played a computerized game with a confederate, and also exam
ined neural activation when they played alone. £MRI results showed a shared pattern of neural
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responses in a frontoparietal network, indicating that both cooperation and competition (compared
to solo play) implicated regions associated with executive functions, and the insula, associated with
autonomic arousal. However, cooperation also uniquely engaged the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC),
whereas competition uniquely engaged the medial PFC. The authors argue that cooperation and
competition, both of which require considering another's perspective and mindset, require greater
attention and executive functioning than solo play. Based on previous research indicating the role
of the orbitofrontal cortex in processing positive feedback, they also suggest that cooperation may
be associated with greater implicit reward (Decety et al., 2004). Greater activation of the medial
PFC during competition may be consistent with an increased focus on the self and one's own
performance.
Consistent with Decety and colleagues' (2004) conclusions that cooperation may be intuitively
rewarding, Rilling et al. (2002) found increased activation of the OFC and the nucleus accumberts
(also associated with both primary rewards, like food and sex, and secondary rewards, like mon
etary gains) during mutual cooperation on a prisoner's dilemma game. The authors argue that
this pattern of findings may reinforce reciprocal altruism, a type of prosocial behavior that may
motivate individuals to cooperate instead of not reciprocating favors, in players. In a separate study,
Rilling, King-Casas, and Sanfey (2008) found that unreciprocated cooperation on the prisoner's
dilemma game was associated with increased activation of the bilateral anterior insula, implicated
in autonomic arousal, and the left hippocampus, a neural structure strongly implicated in episodic
memory. These results may suggest both an increase in arousal and better encoding of the event
when individuals' cooperative behavior is not returned.
Using the ultimatum game, in which one player proposes a split of$10 (the "giver") and a sec
ond can accept or reject it (the "receiver"), rejection of offers increases as a function of the amount
of deviation from a fair split. In other words, a $5/$5 split is accepted by most players, whereas
an $8/$2 split is rejected more often than a $7/$3 split. Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, and
Cohen (2003) found that activation of the insula, associated with arousal and disgust, in receivers
increased as the unfairness of offers increased. Importantly, receivers are less likely to reject unfair
offers if they are made by a computer than by another player, and insula activation to unfair offers
was greater when made by a another player than by a computer. This finding highlights the social
nature of human cooperation; we are more affected by and responsive to uncooperative humans
than to inhuman machines.
Indeed, Fehr and Rockenbach (2004) argue that human cooperation is unique, in that "humans
frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they
will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent" (p. 784). Fehr and Rocken
bach (2004) review the literature on strong reciprocity-the tendency toward altruistic punishment
and reward-which they believe is critical for human cooperation. De Quervain and colleagues
(2004) used PET to examine the neural correlates of altruistic punishment, or the unrewarded and
sometimes costly tendency to punish social defectors. Using a sophisticated experimental paradigm,
the authors showed that the dorsal striatum, a region implicated in reward processing, exhibited
stronger activation during effective punishment (i.e., in which a defector actually received finan
cial punishment) than during symbolic punishment (in which a defector did not receive financial
punishment), suggesting that altruistic punishment may be intrinsically rewarding. Furthermore,
participants with more dorsal striatum activation were willing to incur higher costs to effectively
punish defectors. Altruistic punishment may be one mechanism that humans have developed to
encourage cooperation in social interactions.
Empathy, cooperation, and altruism may not, however, be equally allocated to all conspecif
ics; we may show ingroup members, individuals like us, preferential treatment. Mathur, Harada,
Lipke, and Chiao (2010) investigated the neural basis of extreme empathy and altruism for ingroup
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and outgroup members in Caucasian-American and African-American participants. Participants
viewed scenes depicting ingroup and outgroup members in pain or not in pain (i.e., in a neutral
context). Behaviorally, all participants expressed more empathy for and were willing to donate more
money (i.e., exhibit greater altruistic motivation) to help targets in pain than not in pain; however,
African-American participants also exhibited greater empathy and altruistic motivation for their
ingroup than their outgroup (Caucasian-American participants showed no group differences). In
addition to all participants exhibiting activation of the affective regions of the pain matrix to targets
in pain, African-American participants also showed greater activation of the medial PFC to ingroup
targets in pain than to outgroup targets in pain. Furthermore, the ingroup bias in medial PFC acti
vation also correlated with increased empathy for and altruism toward ingroup members in pain.
The authors argue that these results could indicate that a stronger attachment between self-identity
and group membership may underlie increased empathy and altruism toward ingroup members.

Social Rejection, Loneliness, Exclusion
In addition to shedding light on social psychological processes, social neuroscience has also changed
the way that we think about brain function. One now classic study that is often held as an exam
ple of this (and that has fostered a lengthy discussion about the nature of the relationship between
neural and psychological processes) sought to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying social
rejection. Eisenberger, Lieberman, and W illiams (2003) subjected participants to multiple rounds
of Cyberball, an online ball tossing game, while undergoing fMRI. Importantly, participants were
included by two players in one block and were excluded in a second block. Results showed greater
activation of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a neural region implicated in the experience
of physical pain (cf. Rainville, Duncan, Price, Carrier, & Bushnell, 1997), when participants were
excluded versus included, and greater activation of the ACC during exclusion correlated with
higher self-reported ratings of distress. The authors concluded that the ACC might have been "co
opted" to respond to social as well as physical pain. Although the original study has received much
critique in the field (Rogachov, Cheng, & DeSouza, 2015; Wager et al., 2016), the results challenged
the way that researchers thought about the function of neural regions and networks. Eisenberger
and Lieberman (2004) have argued that the ACC may be best conceived of as a primary component
in a more general neural alarm system that is activated when an individual is threatened in some
way, whether physical or psychological. In general, this line of research has raised questions about
such topics as the utility of reverse inference in neuroimaging research; the study of neural activa
tion at the level of regional patterns, entire structures, or broader networks; the adoption of neural
networks by other related psychological processes; statistical approaches in neuroscience research;
and even the neural representation of psychological processes such as physical or social pain.
Importantly, many researchers have continued to pursue the study of social rejection and exclusion
in order to provide a better understanding of these processes. For example, Somerville, Heatherton, and
Kelley (2006, Somerville, Heatherton, & Kelley, 2010) developed a new paradigm to help dissociate
social rejection from expectancy violation, under the assumption that being excluded from a game of
Cyberball during a second round of play confounds these processes. They found that difference regions
of the ACC are implicated in social rejection (ventral ACC) and in expectancy violation (e.g., receiving
negative feedback when expecting positive; dorsal ACC; Somerville et al., 2006), and that self-esteem
moderated these effects (Somerville et al., 2010). Such follow up studies extend the research on social
exclusion and rejection by carefully attending to multiple processes underlying these high-level, complex
states, while also addressing questions regarding neural function.
Cacioppo and his colleagues (2009) have taken a complementary approach to understanding the
neural mechanisms underlying social pain by studying naturally occurring individual differences in
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self-reported loneliness, or the stable psychological experience of feeling alone. Rather than exam
ining acute responses to rejection in the laboratory, Cacioppo and his colleagues (2009) looked at
how chronically lonely individuals responded to emotional images that were either social (i.e., con
tained people) or nonsocial (did not contain people). Although self-reported emotional responses
to the images did not differ as a function of loneliness, £MRI results indicated that lonely individuals
showed greater activation of the bilateral visual cortex to unpleasant social versus unpleasant non
social images than did nonlonely individuals; whereas activation of the bilateral temporoparietal
junction (fPJ) showed the opposite pattern, with nonlonely individuals showing greater activation
to unpleasant social versus unpleasant nonsocial images than lonely individuals. Given past research
on the contributions of these two regions to psychological processes, the authors tentatively suggest
that lonely individuals may pay more attention to pictures of distressed others (given visual cortex
activation), but that nonlonely individuals may engage in more perspective taking when viewing
pictures of distressed others (fPJ; Ruby & Decety, 2004). Furthermore, neural responses of the
ventral striatum to pleasant images showed a crossover interaction, with lonely individuals showing
greater activation to pleasant nonsocial images and nonlonely individuals showing greater activation
to pleasant soda/ images. Given the role of the ventral striatum in reward processing (cf. O'Doherty,
2004), these data suggest that people are not as rewarding to chronically lonely individuals as they
are to nonlonely individuals (Cacioppo, Hawkley, Norman, & Berntson, 2011).
It's important to note that many of these findings are subject to criticism based on their reliance
on reverse inference, or the assumption that activation of a neural region may be indicative of a
psychological process that has previously been associated with that region. However, studies such
as this may shed further light on the psychological processes that underlie chronic loneliness (or
other negative psychological states), which may help direct interventions and treatments focused
on their easement.

Intergroup Processes: Stereotypes, Prejudice, Discrimination, and Race Bias
Perhaps one of the research areas that has benefited most from incorporating a neuroscientific
perspective and methods to study social psychological questions is that of intergroup processes,
including social categorization, stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. Clearly, understanding
intergroup processes is critical for any culture, and the field of social psychology has led this
investigation throughout its long history. Yet, such processes can be difficult to study in an egali
tarian society, both due to lack of ability to accurately introspect on internal processes (Nisbett &
Wilson, 1977) and to reporting biases driven by either societal standards or desire for positive self
presentations. Researchers realized the need for creativity in their assessment of individuals' atti
tudes and feelings toward members of other social groups (as well as their own self-reported group
membership; Alexander and Fisher, 2003), giving rise to such approaches as the "bogus pipeline," in
which participants are convinced that (sham) physiological equipment can detect the direction and
extremity of their "true" feelings Oones & Sigall, 1971). A meta-analysis conducted on 31 bogus
pipeline (BPL) studies revealed reliable decreases in socially desirable responses (Roese & Jamieson,
1993). It is not surprising, therefore, that social neuroscientists have adopted multiple psychophysi
ological and neuroimaging methods to study intergroup processes.
In 2000, two landmark studies examined neural responses to members of racial outgroups;
specifically, both Hart and colleagues (2000) and Phelps and colleagues (2000) focused on neural
responses in the amygdala to ingroup versus outgroup faces. Although it might be assumed that
given these similarities, the two studies should show convergent results and draw parallel conclu
sions, methodological and theoretical differences between the two research groups led to slightly
divergent perspectives. Hart and colleagues (2000) recruited both self-identified Black and White
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participants and showed both Black and White faces. Their analysis collapsed across race and
instead focused on "ingroup" (White participants viewing White faces; Black participants view
ing Black faces) versus "outgroup" (White participants viewing Black faces; Black participants
viewing White faces) responses in the amygdala. In addition, trials were divided into early and
late scans to allow for an investigation of amygdala responses over time. Perhaps surprisingly, they
found no differences in amygdala responses to ingroup versus outgroup faces in the early scan, but
a larger (maintained) amygdala response to outgroup versus ingroup faces in the late scan. Hart
and colleagues (2000) argue ingroup faces elicit a faster habituation ofthe amygdala response than
do outgroup faces, and that this finding is consistent with the interpretation that individuals show
more rapid familiarization ofingroup versus outgroup members.
Phelps and colleagues (2000) examined amygdala responses to White (ingroup) versus Black
(outgroup) faces in a group of all White participants. They also found no group differences to
White versus Black faces during early trials, consistent with Hart and colleagues (2000). However,
they did note that there was variability in individuals' responses, with a majority showing greater
amygdala activation to Black versus White faces. Importantly, this variability was related to indi
rect measures ofrace bias using the eyeblink startle paradigm (Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Devine,
2003) and the race bias version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, &
Schwartz, 1998). White participants exhibiting stronger amygdala responses to Black versus White
faces also tended to show larger eyeblink startle responses to Black versus White faces and a stronger
implicit race bias on the IAT. To support their conclusions that the variability in amygdala activa
tion to Black versus White faces was "a reflection of culturally acquired knowledge about social
groups filtered through individual experience" (p. 733), the authors conducted a second experi
ment that was identical in methods and analysis but used familiar and well-liked Black and White
faces in both the £MRI and IAT tasks. As predicted, there was no overall pattern oflarger amygdala
responses to Black or White faces, and the variability in these differences did not correlate with
either eyeblink startle or IAT scores. Thus, using familiar and well-liked Black and White faces
eliminated the effect. Taken together, Hart and colleagues (2000) and Phelps and colleagues (2000)
both showed that larger amygdala responses to outgroup versus ingroup faces seems to be driven by
a lack offamiliarity (and consequent slower habituation) with outgroup members.
Following these two pioneering studies, a great number of researchers have utilized £MRI and
other neuroimaging methods to investigate the mechanisms underlying stereotypes, prejudice, dis
crimination, and race bias. One limitation of these methods, however, is their relatively slow tem
poral resolution. ERPs allow researchers to investigate how such processes unfold over time, also
shedding light on the stage at which social categorization and intergroup biases emerge and begin
to affect behavior. Using ERPs, Ito and Urland (2003) found that within 100 ms of presentation,
Black faces elicited more attention than did White faces in mostly White participants, and nota
bly that gender was categorized 50 ms after race. This research is important as it investigates social
categorization of individuals from multiple categories; Ito and her colleagues have followed up by
using ERPs to look at the categorization ofmixed or ambiguous race individuals. Correll, Urland,
and Ito (2006) used ERPs to investigate the mechanisms underlying the shooter bias, the tendency for
individuals to "shoot" armed Black men more quickly and frequently than armed White men in a
videogame simulation. They found that the shooter bias was predicted by knowledge ofthe cultural
stereotype ofBlacks, and that this relationship was mediated by differences in the amplitudes ofthe
P200 and N200 components ofthe ERP to Black versus White targets, suggesting that differential
attention to outgroup members is a mechanism that drives the shooter bias. In addition to ERPs,
other psychophysiological measures have been used to study race bias. Amodio et al. (2003) showed
that eyeblink startle amplitudes were larger to Black than to White faces, but only for individuals
low in internal motivation to respond without prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998), suggesting that
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individuals who do not internalize the goal to act unprejudiced respond more negatively to Black
targets.
Importantly, researchers have begun to investigate the neural correlates of changes in intergroup
processes. Van Bavel, Packer, and Cunningham (2008) randomly assigned participants to one of
two mixed-race (Black and White) teams in a modified version of the minimal groups paradigm,
which has previously shown that arbitrary assignment to a group can foster ingroup favoritism
(fajfel, 1970). Following two learning tasks in which participants learned and were tested on their
memory for ingroup vs. outgroup members, participants performed a team member categoriza
tion task in the £MRI scanner and subsequently rated their liking for all targets (both ingroup and
outgroup members, both Black and White targets). Liking ratings revealed ingroup favoritism,
with ingroup members liked more than outgroup members; and this effect was not moderated by
race, indicating that Black and White ingroup members were equally liked. £MRI results showed
greater activation of the fusiform gyrus, the amygdala, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and the
dorsal striatum to ingroup than to outgroup members, and these results were not moderated by
race. The ingroup effect in the fusiform gyrus, a region implicated in face processing, is consistent
with previous results indicating a bias toward processing ingroup (and indeed, own-race; Golby,
Gabrieli, Chiao, & Eberhardt, 2001) faces. Although the amygdala has in the past been strongly
associated with negative affect, the current results are more consistent with the interpretation that
the amygdala is sensitive to biological (or motivational) relevance. This conclusion is supported by
greater activation of the OFC and dorsal striatum, two regions associated with reward processing,
to ingroup versus outgroup faces (Van Bavel et al., 2008). Thus, a simple minimal groups paradigm
effectively increased not only self-reported liking of team members, but also affected the neural
processes associated with responses to ingroup members (deeper processing of faces, increased
motivation, increased reward). The malleability of perceptions of and neural responses to (arbitrarily
assigned) group members may have implications for the reduction of outgroup bias more broadly.

Interacting With Others
Although the field of social neuroscience is, by definition, concerned with how we understand,
respond to, and interact with other people, it is notable that much of the field's research focuses
on individuals acting alone, in the solitude of an £MRI or PET scanner or a sound-attenuated,
electrically isolated chamber. We study perspective taking by asking participants to imagine what
someone depicted in an image is thinking, instead of utilizing paradigms that allow individuals to
interact naturally and require perspective taking (e.g., the director task; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003,
and see Dumontheil, Kuster, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010 for an adaptation of this paradigm for
use with £MRI). We examine cooperation using a computerized economic decision-making task
that ultimately has no impact on a future relationship or the possibility of real reciprocity, instead of
creating realistic scenarios in which cooperation has consequences for participants. We investigate
race bias and prejudice by measuring brain activation in response to novel, unfamiliar faces from
different races, absent of context, participants' backgrounds, or additional interpersonal cues. The
general reliance in social neuroscience on studies focused on the individual rather than those that
incorporate an interpersonal component is likely due to at least three factors: first, limitations intro
duced by the dominant methods of the field, including psychophysiology (which often requires
electrically and audibly quiet rooms for data collection) and neuroimaging (placing an individual
in a scanner constrains the ability to examine interactions naturally; second, examining social ques
tions at the dyadic or group level requires highly complex data analyses, given the co-dependence
between observations; and third, the laboratory environment provides a high degree of control,
allowing researchers to minimize confounds and noise, while maximizing psychological realism.
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One of the most exciting current directions in social neuroscience, however, is towards the study of
people interacting with people. An example of this approach that we have already discussed is that
of work on empathy for pain; Singer and her colleagues (2004) pioneered the use of actual pain
simulation applied to a participant or her romantic partner while neuroimaging data were collected.
Although this paradigm allows for the investigation of a single brain responding to a present, real-life
social stimulus, it represents an attempt to examine responses to others in vivo (and notably, results
generalize to more typical empathy paradigms, including picture-based approaches; Lamm et al.,
2011). We turn now to research that examines how individuals interact with others.
A critical question for psychological research in general is the degree to which findings replicate
across contexts: in social psychology, this question concerns whether an individual responds the
same when alone versus when with a stranger, with a friend, or in front of an audience. We have
known throughout the history of psychology that the social context has an impact on behavior, as
arguably the first social psychological study showed that cyclists ride faster in the presence of pacers
or competitors than when alone (Triplett, 1898; but see Strube, 2005). Similarly, Fridlund (1991;
Fridlund, Kenworthy, & Jaffey, 1992) showed that positive and negative facial expressions were aug
mented in the presence of a real or imagined audience, and suggested that the social context may
have a stronger impact on facial expressions than the experience of emotion itself. One criticism of
this initial study, however, was its reliance on self-reports; Hess, Banse, and Kappas (1995) replicated
the work using facial electromyography (EMG) and found that, indeed, social context (i.e., stran
gers versus friends) did have an impact on emotional expression-but it is more complicated than
Fridlund originally argued. Thus, the inclusion of psychophysiological data clarified the role of the
social context on emotional expressions.
Importantly, Hess and her colleagues (1995) found that the nature of the social relationship was
also critical; expressions were different when in the presence of a friend versus a stranger. Many
dyadic studies have capitalized on existing relationships (e.g., friends, romantic partners) to study
how both presence of another person and both nature and quality of the existing relationship affect
neural and behavioral responses. Coan, Schaefer, and Davidson (2006) examined the social regula
tion of threat responses by collecting fMRI data while female participants completed a threat of
shock task, in which visual cues either predicted safety (no shock) or threat (20% chance of shock)
on individual trials. Critically, participants held the hand of either their husband or a male experi
menter (i.e., relative stranger) in two critical blocks of trials, and were alone in a third block. The
authors observed widespread reduction of neural activation in regions associated with emotional
and behavioral responses to threat when wives held the hands of their husbands, and attenuated
reduction when they held the hands of a male stranger. Furthermore, marital satisfaction predicted
greater reductions of activation in the insula, superior frontal gyrus, and hypothalamus, regions
implicated in threat responses, when holding the hands of their husbands but not the stranger,
suggesting that not only the immediate social context, but also the relationship history and quality
were effective at reducing neural responses to threat.
Coan and his colleagues (2006), along with Singer and her colleagues (2004), introduced a
new paradigm to the fMRI literature that allowed for the investigation of how social relationships
and interactions can impact responses to stimuli such as pain and threat. Neuroimaging methods,
however, have not typically allowed for simultaneous data collection in two (or more) interacting
individuals (although this is changing). Instead, researchers have used psychophysiological measures
to examine bodily signals in two interacting individuals. For example, Gottman, Coan, Carrere, and
Swanson (1998) found that when newlywed couples engaged in a discussion about a marital issue
in the laboratory, lack of physiological soothing of the male (in addition to a number of other fac
tors) predicted divorce. More recent studies have investigated the role of not only the individuals'
physiological responses, but the synchrony or covariation of those responses in predicting outcome
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factors. Helm, Sbarra, and Ferrer (2014) examined the covariation of respiratory sinus arrhythmia
(RSA; a measure of parasympathetic activation) in interacting heterosexual romantic couples, and
found that both males' and females' RSA responses were associated with their partners' previous
RSA responses, and that this covariation was stronger for couples with higher relationship satisfac
tion. A number of theoretical (e.g., Butler & Randall, 2013) and analytical (e.g., Helm, Sbarra, &
Ferrer, 2012; McAssey, Helm, Hsieh, Sbarra, & Ferrer, 2013) innovations have been introduced that
will pave the way for future advances in the study of synchrony between individuals.
Indeed, researchers have already begun to examine synchrony of EEG activity during interper
sonal interactions as a way of understanding social behavior. Using an iterated prisoner's dilemma
game, Fallani and colleagues (2010) examined EEG connectivity in individual brains as well as
relationships between brains while pairs of (unfamiliar) participants made cooperative and nonco
operative decisions. The authors introduce the concept of a "hyp er-brain network" to examine
interbrain links, and found that fewer interbrain links and higher modularity between partners pre
dicted noncooperative decisions. In other words, patterns of EEG across partners directly related to
how individuals played the game. In a motor imitation task, Dumas, Nadal, Soussignan, Martinerie,
and Gamero (2010) found that participants did, indeed, engage in more synchronous than non
synchronous activity both when instructed to imitate and when not instructed to imitate (i.e., they
exhibited spontaneous synchrony). Furthermore, behavioral synchrony was associated with inter
brain synchrony of a particular frequency band of the EEG (alpha-mu) over right centroparietal
regions, including the right temporoparietal cortex (TPJ). The authors suggest that these findings
are consistent with the role of the TPJ in understanding others' actions and taking the perspective
of others, and then interbrain synchrony of right TPJ activation may predict synchronous behavior
within dyads.
Yun, Watanabe, and Shimojo (2012) conducted a study that uniquely complements this previous
research by first having pairs of participants engage in a cooperative interaction and then examining
. the effects on imitation and EEG synchrony. As expected, cooperative interaction increased motor
imitation (of simple fingertip movements) and neural synchrony, most notably in the inferior fron
tal gyrus (IFG; a region implicated in the human mirror neural network) and the medial frontal
regions (implicated in mentalizing). Thus, increased behavioral mimicry following cooperation
may be driven by synchronous brain activation in either mirroring or mentalizing networks.
In sum, researchers are making great strides toward studying interacting social brains, a direction
that is likely to shed new light on how we understand social cognitive processes such as perspec
tive taking, theory of mind, empathy, cooperation, and even race bias. Liu and Pelowski (2014) and
W heatley, Kang, Parkinson, and Looser (2012), among others, have written excellent reviews of
the issues inherent in taking a "two-person neuroscience" (2PN) approach to understanding social
processes, as well as the mechanisms required for synchrony and the consequences of synchrony
for social behavior. The study of interacting brains has great promise for the future of the field of
social neuroscience.
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